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MATTHEW PAGANO, CARMAN 
PAGANO and MILLEO PAGANO, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
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MARY P. WALKER, 
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Case No. 
13864 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in equity brought by respondents 
against appelant, their sister, to require appelant to 
divide funds, obtained thirough joint tenancy accounts 
with their mother, under circumstances where appellant 
has adknowledged that she was directed by her mother 
to divide this money with her brothers. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial count, aaffeer trial with an advisory jury, fen-
pressed a constructive trust on the funds and rendered 
judgment requiring appellant to divide the funds with 
respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation on the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of feet is correct as to the 
portions presented, but there are many important omis-
sions regarding events both prior and subsequent to the 
death of Lucy Plagano, that form a basis for the court's 
equity decision. 
Luke Pagano and Lucy Pagano had five children, 
the parties of this action,, and a son Charles, who died in 
1947. This couple, with the help of their two oldest sons, 
Matthew and Carman (TR 83,129), operated small truck 
garden farms both within and outside the city limits of 
Ogden during their entire adult life (TR 24, 25, 82, 129). 
They were extremely frugal and invested their earnings 
in land, mortgages and escrows (TR 29, 231). Both Luke 
and Lucy Pagano were born in Italy, and although they 
were intelligent people, they had very little formal edu-
cation (TR 27). Luke P&gano died in Ogden, January 
5, 1965, and at the time of his death the joint tenancy 
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estate (TR 27, 28) with his wife, Lucy Fagiaino, was ap-
praised at $124,703.31. 
After the death of her father, Luke Pagano, appel-
lant's name was placed on all the accounts in issue, ex-
cept one (TR 44, 45, 46). The accounts were established 
as joint accounts in the names of Lucy Pagano and Mary 
Walker (TR 44, 45, 46). 
Appellant did not make any deposits of her own 
funds to said joint accounts, (TR 231) and die did not 
make any withdrawals for her own use from any of the 
joint accounts during her mother's lifetime. Appellant 
testified that she made withdrawals at the request of 
her mother, and that all funds so withdrawn were de-
livered to her mother (TR 41). The amount of money 
in dispute in this action is $73,544.00 (TR 2, 26). 
Lucy P&gano died at Ogden, Utah, on June 12,1972, 
at the age of 81 years (TR 118). She left a last will and 
testament which was admitted to probate in Weber 
County, and said will provided in part as follows: 
"THIRD; After payment of my debts, funeral 
expenses, expenses of last illness and expenses of 
administration, I GIVE, DEVISE AND BE-
QUEATH to my husband, LUKE PAGANO, all 
of the remainder of my estate, real, personal, 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event of 
his prior death or in the event of his death prior 
to distribution of my estate, then I give, devise 
and bequeath all of my said estate to my four 
dhiidren, share and share alike, namely: 
Matthew Pagano, my son 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Carman Pagano, my son 
Maiy Pagano Adams, my daughter 
Miileo Pagano, my son" (PI Ex B). 
During her lifetime Lucy Plagiano made gifts of funds 
to her children. In .fyprtil, 1967, she made the following 
gifts: $5,000.00 to Matthew Pagano, $5,000.00 to Carman 
Pagano, $4,000.00 to Mary Walker and $4,000.00 to Miileo 
Pagano (TR 85, 86). Thereafter Lucy Pagano made the 
following gifts: May 1969—$3,000.00 to Matthew Pagano, 
$3,000.00 to Carman Pagano, $1,500.00 to Miileo P&gano 
and $1,500.00 to Mary Walker (TR 26); on January 14, 
1970, $2,000.00 to Caiman Pagano (TR 87, 93,143) repre-
senting a portion of his investment in a farm; in January 
1970, $500.00 to Matthew Pagano, $400.00 to Caiman 
Pagano, $300.00 to Miileo P&gamo and $300.00 to Mary 
Walker (TR 86). Lucy Pagano also made many small 
gifts to her <±ildren such as homemade bread, spaghetti, 
and other small items, and she was careful, in each case, 
to make such gifts veary nearly equal (TR 57). 
It was necessary, upon Lucy Pagano's death on June 
12, 1972, to name an administrator with will annexed of 
her estate, since her husband, Luke Pagano, who was 
named executor of her will, had predeceased her. All 
four of her children, Matthew, Carman, Miileo and Mary, 
met at Millelo's home in Ogden to determine who the 
administrator should be. This meeting was held about 
two weeks after their mother's death. It was then de-
termined that Carman Pagano and Mary Walker would 
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act as joint administrators (TO 75, 262). At this meet-
ing there was conversation about the joint accounts, and 
Mary made the following statement: "Mother told me 
to keep a little out for my arthritis and divide the nest 
up" (TO 155, 121, 122, 123). A few days later Maay 
suggested that Lynn Walker, her husband, serve as a 
joint administrator in her place, and on June 30, 1972, 
all of the parties hereto signed a document nominating 
Carman Pagano and Lynn Walker as joint administrators 
of the Estate of Lucy P&gano with the wil annexed (PI 
ExC) . 
Appellant had possession of an insurance policy on 
Carman Fagamo's life, and her husband, Lynn Walker, de-
livered it to him near the end of September 1972 (TO 
62). Appellant also had possession of an insurance policy 
on Milleo Fagano's life, and in September 1972, Milleo's 
wife, Margaret,, telephoned Mary in regard to the posses-
sion of this policy (TO 15). At this request Mary replied, 
"Well, I'm the beneficiary on it, it belongs to me. Fur-
thermore, I'm not going to divide the money" (TO 15). 
The following Sunday, Mary and Lynn Walker went to 
Milleo's home, delivered the insurance policy, and Mary 
told Milleo and Margaret that she was not going to divide 
the money (TO 22). She then added, "And don't you 
ever tell anyone I've got this money" (TO 15, 16, 17, 
128). 
During Lucy P&gamo's lifetime there existed a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence between her and her 
daughter, Mary Walker (TO 28). Lucy Paganiq, while 
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an intelligent person, had only a first grade ediication, 
and she relied on Mary to assist heir in preparing papans 
and accounts (TR 27). Mary had a high school educa-
tion, a year of business college training, and she had 
worked for six years >as a secretary for a finance company 
(TR 26, 27). 
On cross examination, Appellant testified that Lucy 
Pagamo gave her the passbooks on the accounts involved 
in this case because she was afraid someone would break 
into her (Lucy's) house (TR 70, 230). During her life-
time, Lucy Plagano kept herself informed as to the balance 
in her accounts (TR 36). 
While Lucy Pagsino was hospitalized in March of 
1972, Carman P&gano and appellant had a conversation 
at the hospital wherein Mary said, "There is not as much 
money in the bank as Milleo thinks there is." She further 
stated that her mother said to make sure that Carman 
paid off the mortgage on his home (TR 78, 79, 95, 96, 
107). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS ' C L E A R AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE' TO SUPPORT THE FINDING 
OF FACT THAT APPELLANT MADE THE 
FOLOWING STATOMENT TO HER BROTH-
ERS: "MOTHER TOLD ME TO PAY HER 
BILLS, KEEP A LITTLE OUT FOR MY 
ARTHRITIS AND DIVIDE UP THE REST." 
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Respondents have no dispute with ihe long standing 
rule that the evidence required to establish a constructive 
trust must be 'clear and convincing'. However, such rule 
does not go so far as to say that the evidence relied upon 
to establish the constructive trust must be uncontradicted. 
Appellant makes no claim of error on the part of the 
court in regard to the standard used by the court in 
weighing the evidence or in the court's instmotions to 
the advisory jury. The court, after having heard the evi-
dence, clearly stated to counsel that the matter was going 
to be decided by the court in accordance with the rules 
of equity. The statements made by the court at the 
conclusion of the trial, and the findings and judgment 
by the court were made in accordance with equitable 
rules. The Utah Supreme Court has established the stan-
dard for review of equitable decisions governing the de-
termination of a trust as follows: 
"The fundamental problem is whether the evi-
dence will support the determination of trust. 
Or conversely, to apply the rule of review in 
equity cases: does the evidence 'clearly pre-
ponderate against the finding of the trial court' 
so that we would reverse such finding." Acott 
v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P. 2d 720, at 
Page 722. 
The finder of the facts considered two separate occa-
sions on which the appellant stated that she held the 
funds in issue in accordance with her mother's instruc-
tions to divide the money with her brothers. The first 
occasion was the meeting of all of the members of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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immediate family at Milleo's home for the purpose of 
naming an administrator with the will annexed. Present 
on this occasion were Matthew Pagano, Carman Pagiano, 
Milleo and Margaret P&gainQ, appellant Mary Walker and 
her husband, Lynn Walker. Each of the respondents tes-
tified that on this particular occasion Milleo Pagano 
brought up the question of the money in their mother's 
savings accounts, and that Mary then made the statement, 
"Mother told me to pay her bills, keep a little out for 
my arthritis and divkle up the nest." Respondents' evi-
dence on what occurred on this occasion is dear and 
definite. Appellant's testimony in response was that 
she did not remember being at Milleo's home on such 
occasion (TR 51, 52, 53 & 189). However, appellant's 
husband, Lynn Walker', clearly recalled the meeting, and 
he testified on cross examination as follows: 
"As near as I remember the instance, it was at 
Milleo's home where we did first get together and 
discuss the administrators. 
Q. And that is consistent, of course, with the 
testimony of Carman and of Matthew and of 
Milleo, isn't it, and of Margaret? 
A. I believe it is. 
Q. And that is not consistent with Mary's tes-
timony, is it? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Mary said she had no recollection of such 
a meeting? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. But was Mary present with you at that 
meeting? 
A. Well, I am sure she was" (TR 263). 
Appellant's contention is that the only thing she said 
about the bank accounts was: 
"That if they (her brothers) did not cause trou-
ble for her she would consider setting aside some 
of the funds left to her in the joint tenancy ac-
count and divide them with her brothers as she 
saw fit." (Appellant's brief, pages 7-8.) 
The second occasion on which appellant declared 
she had been instructed to divide the funds in the bank 
accounts occurred in July, 1972, when appellant and her 
husband, Carman Pagano and Mileo Pagano met at 
their mother's home. In regard to this occasion Mileo 
testified as follows: 
"Q. And at that time did Mary make any state-
ment concerning the money in the bank ac-
counts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what were they? 
A. She said she would divide the money up if 
there wasn't any trouble. 
Q. And what did you say about — what was 
your comment on that? 
A. I told her I don't see how there could be 
any trouble. 
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Q. Was there any trouble at that time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you all getting along reasonably well? 
A. Yes, sir" (TR 125). 
Appellant's position regarding her statements to her 
brothers about dividing the money is contained in her 
testimony in response to questions from her own counsel: 
"Q. Did you ever state that you would under 
any circumstances give part of the money to 
them, or did you state, as you have said, I will 
see about the money? 
A. I will see about the money. I never said I 
would give them any amount or anything. I 
said I would see about the money" (TR 194). 
Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468,175 P. 2d 470, is similar 
to the case before the court in many respects. The Oapps 
case was concerned with the claim of the three children 
of a deceased veteran that the mother of the veteran held 
the proceeds of his National Service Life Insurance Policy 
in trust for his children's benefit in accordance with the 
instructions be gave his mother before leaving for the 
combat zone where he was killed in action. The evidence 
in support of the creation and acknowledgement of the 
trust included statements made by the mother of the 
veteran, after his death, to the effect that she was collect-
ing the insurance proceeds for the benefit of her deceased 
son's children. The Ufeih Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court which imposed a trust upon 
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the insurance proceeds and stated at page 475: 
"It is true that in nearly ail the cases decided by 
this court we have held that in order to estab-
lish a trust by parol, the proof must be dear 
and convincing; but some of the clear and con-
vincing evidence may be furnished by the defen-
dant, as in this case." 
The rule adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
case of Vaughcm v. First Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, 85 Idaho 266, 378 P. 2d 820, is: 
"Whether the evidence is dear and convincing 
as regards the establishment of the trust was a 
question for detennination by the trial court in 
the first instance. In re Alberts' Estate, 38 Cal. 
App, 42, 100 P. 2d 538, 'Ordinarily, it is a ques-
tion of fact for the trial court to determine', Fritz 
v. Thompson (Cal. App.), 271 P. 2d 205, 210." 
In the case of Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 
P. 2d 253, the court was presented with a case wherein 
plaintiffs brought an action to impose a trust upon realty 
which was originally a part of their father's estate. The 
trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and imposed 
the trust. There was a dispute in the evidence, and pre-
liminary to its review of the evidence the Utah Supreme 
Court stated at page 255 of the opinion: 
"Where there is a dispute in the evidence we 
view it in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings." 
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Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Jewel v. 
Harmer, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594, for revereal of the 
findings and judgment of the trial court. There are many 
substantial differences hetwen the facts in the Jewel case 
and the facts in the instant case. In the Jewel case the 
eivdence in support of the Plaintiffs consisted of state-
meets the deceased was alleged to have made to the 
plaintiffs concerning ihe estaiblishmeot of the trust. On 
behalf of the defendaost, Ethel Jewel Harmer, there was 
substantial evidence of statements by independent wit-
nesses that her father intended to leave the property to 
Ethel, subject however to his life estate and a life estate 
in favor of his surviving widow, as provided in the deed. 
There was undisputed evidence that Ethel personally 
paid for the improvem<3nts to the property after the exe-
cution of the deed. In the Jewel case there was no evi-
dence of the acknowledgement of the trust by ihe per-
son holding title for the benefit of the beneficiaries, as 
there is in the case now before the court. The evidence in 
the Jewel case was in great dispute. The plaintiffs' prin-
cipal independent witaass^ Fred Jensen, on cross exam-
ination, admitted that he had made a statement to Ethel 
Jewel and her attorney prior to trial, that was in direct 
conflict with his testimony on direct examination. 
The rule in equity cases as adopted by the Court 
in the Jewel case at page 597 is: 
"* * * this court, upon review, should not 
set aside the finding of the lower court unless 
it manifestly appears that the lower court has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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misapplied proven facts or that the finding is 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
POINT IL 
APPELLANT'S DECLARATION OF THE IN-
STRUCTIONS SHE RECEIVED FROM HER 
MOTHER CONCERNING THE DIVISION 
OF THE FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND 
THEN HER SUBSEQUENT REPUDIATION 
OF HER TRUST JUSTIFY THE COURT IN 
IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. . 
Appellant claims that even if it is found that she 
made such a declaration, that the daim of constructive 
trust must Ml as a matter of law. Appellant further 
claims that theire is no evidence that Lucy Pagano at-
tempted to set up a txust or that Appellant agneed to a 
trust relationship. 
The evidence proving the creation of a trust is pro-
vided by appellant's own declaration, as found by the 
court and advisory jury, "Mother told me to take a little 
out for my arthritis and divide the rest" (TR 76, 122, 
155). This type of declaration creates a trust in accord-
ance with Restatement of Trusts 2d Sec. 17, which states: 
"Section 17. METHODS OF CREATING A 
TRUST. A trust may be created by (a) adeda-
ration by the owner of property that he holds 
it as trustee for another person; or . . ." 
This section clearly recognizes the principle that an 
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owner of property, by a declaration, can create a trust in 
the property as trustee for another person. The legal 
effect of appellant's statement to her brothers that she 
was holding these accounts under her mother's instruc-
tions to divide these funds among her three brothers and 
herself is clearly a dtxdaration of the nature referred to 
in Sec. 17 of the Restatement of Trusts. Appellant's 
declaration was made after her mother's death and at 
a time when she held legal title to the funds in the vari-
ous bank accounts by virtue of her being the surviving 
joint tenant. 
The fact that appellant is both trustee and a bene-
ficiary does not in any way affect the validity of the trust 
or change her obligation as trustee. Section 99 of the 
Restatement of Trusts, provides as follows: 
"Section 99. BENEFICIARY AS TRUSTEE. 
. . . . (2) One of several beneficiaries of a trust 
can be the sole trustee of the trust." 
Appellant contends that there is no evidence tfaa/t 
she agreed to the trust relationship. Her own statement 
as well as her conduct dearly establish her acceptance. 
The testimony of all of the witnesses is replete with ex-
amples of the relationship of trust and confidence that 
existed between appellant and her mother (TR 196). It 
has been conceded a relationship of trust and confidence 
existed between appellant and her mother. In addition 
to the declaration made: by appellant, as found by the 
court and jury, there is also the evidence of appellant's 
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statement to her brother, Milleo, at her mother's home, 
"That she would divide the money if there was no trou-
ble" (TR 124). Also in evidence is appellant's statement 
to her brother, Carman, while Lucy P&gano was in the 
hospital, to the effect that "Mother told me to make sure 
you paid off your mortgage" (TR 99). Tins statement 
was made at a time when Mary and Carman were dis-
cussing the bank accounts. All of these statements made 
by a person in a fidcuiary relationship establish the fact 
that the trust was accepted by the appellant. The rule 
governing the acceptance of a trust is set forth in the Re-
statement of Trusts 2d Sec. 102: 
"Section 102 . . . (2) If a trustee has accepted 
the trust, whether the acceptance is indicated by 
words or by conduct, he cannot thereafter dis-
claim . • " 
Each of the respondents testified that they relied on 
appellant's declaration to the effect that she intended to 
divide the accumulated savings accounts of her mother. 
Their conduct emphasizes their reliance upon her decla-
ration, The good feeling that existed among the parties 
after appellant's statement at Miileo's home is apparent 
by the feet that respondents agreed that appellant's hus-
band, Lynn Walker, be nominated to act as one of the 
administrators with the will annexed of Lucy Pagano's 
estate. 
I t was not until about three months after Lucy's 
death that any of the respondents learned that appellant 
had any intention of keeping all of these funds for herself 
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and making no division. The first indication to respon-
dents that appellant did not intend to divide the funds 
came in a telephone itxwiversation between appellant and 
Margaret Plagano, Milleo's wife, in September, 1972, when 
appellant said, "And furthermore I have decided not to 
divide the money, and I won't have a guilty conscience 
about it — it is mine" (TR 15). The preceding state-
ment, made in September 1972, is a statement which is 
clearly indicative of a sudden change of mind when com-
pared with appellant's statements made in June and July, 
1972, to the effect thai; her mother told her to divide the 
money, (TR 194) and that she would divide the money 
if there was no trouble, Appellant's reversal of her previ-
ously stated position was further emphasized when she 
wemft to her brother Milleo's home and delivered his in-
surance policy to him. At that time she told Milleo and 
his wife, Margaret, that she wasn't going to divide the 
money (TR 124). Appellant further told Milleo, "Dont 
you ever tell anyone I have got this money" (TR 17, 
128). 
A constructive trust arises where a person holding 
legal title to property is subject to an equitable duty to 
convey it to another; and the holder of the legal title 
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain 
such title. Appellant's declaration concerning the funds 
accumulated by her parents clearly establishes that it 
was not Lucy Pagano's intention that appellant be the 
sole beneficiary of these iiinds. Under such circumstances 
appellant would surely be unjustly enriched if she were 
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not required to divide the funds with her brothers. Lucy 
Pagano's concern and pattern of conduct toward all of 
her children during her lifetime and the provision in her 
last will and testament for equal division among all her 
children show a clear intent to provide for all of her 
children. This intent is consistent with the statement 
appellant made to her brothers, and it is totally incon-
sistent with appellant's present position that she has "de-
cided not to divide the money". The cases clearly support 
the view that a constructive trust will be imposed by the 
court to protect persons who have been wrongfully de-
prived of their rightful share of property. The case be-
fore the court contains a record of overwhelming evidence 
of a confidential relationship between appellant and her 
mother. This relationship of trust and confidence im-
posed a duty on appellant not to abuse such trust, nor 
to use it to obtain an unfair advantage over her brothers. 
POINT HI. 
THE COURT ORDERED THE DISTRIBU-
TION OF THE FUNDS IN THE BANK AC-
COUNTS IN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH LONG ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES 
OF LAW. 
The function of the trial court sitting in equity was 
to determine what distribution the court should make 
when a trustee has failed and refused to carry out the 
terms of the trust. This particular question is dealt with 
in detail in the case of In Re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah 
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89, 143 P. 124. In this case the issue before dhe court 
was what distribution shall the equity court make when 
a trustee has refused to follow the directions provided 
in the Testator's will. The Testator's will provided as 
follows: 
"All the rest, res ide and remainder of my prop-
erty of every kind and nature whatsoever, if any, 
which remain after paying discharging all the 
debts, bequests, legacies and obligations I be-
queath to the said Hubbard Tufctfe, Sr. I t is my 
desire that he shall distribute the same, or the 
proceeds thereof among my nephews and nieces, 
and to such of them, and in such proportions,, 
as he shall deem just and proper, and his deci-
sion upon such matters shall be final, conclusive 
and binding upon all panties." 
In the above case the Trustee, instead of distributing 
the funds among the nieces and nephews as specified by 
the will, filed a document with the court whereby he ap-
pointed all of the funds to himself. The nieces and 
nephew filed objections to the proposed distribution by 
the Trustee, and they asked that ca r te l portions of the 
estate be distributed to them. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
bequest in which the testatrix expressed her wish or 
desire that the trustee distribute the residue or remainder 
among her nieces and nephews was not to be regarded 
as merely surplusage and without any force whatsoever, 
but it would be carried out and enforced by the court. 
The court at Page 128 of the Opinion, citing from 2 Beach 
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on Trusts, page 142, said: 
"But,, where for any reason, the discretionary 
power is not exercised, the entire class of the 
objects of the trust will be entitled to the prop-
erty, and they will share and share alike." 
The court further considered the nature of the dis-
tribution that should be made at page 128 as follows: 
"Where the testator has invested the trustee 
with discretion to select the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries from a certain class and to determipe 
the amount that should go to each, and in case 
the trustee has honestly and in good faith exer-
cised the discretion by making a selection and 
by fixing the amounts, the courts will not inter-
fere with what the trustee has done in that re-
gard; but in case he has not complied with the 
terms of the trust in making a distribution, or 
has entirely failed to make any distribution, the 
courts, at the instance of an interested party in 
a proper proceeding, will make a distribution in 
such manner and upon such terms and conditions 
as may be equitable and as will best effectuate 
the purpose and intention of the testator." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The court further quoted 1 Beach on Trusts, page 
263, and stated: 
"But if the donee for any reason fails to act and 
the property is not divided, equity will interpose 
in favor of the beneficiaries by treating it as a 
power in trust and enforcing its execution. In 
such cases the distribution by the court will be 
to all the individuals of the class designated and 
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in equal sums." (Emphasis added.) 
The decision of the court was set forth as follows: 
"In the case at bar the trustee, under the pro-
visions of the will, could have executed the trust 
by making an equal division of the residue of the 
estate among all of the nephews and nieces, ex-
cluding himself, and therefore a court of equity 
may do so." 
In the case of In re Boyd's Estate, 87 Sb. 2d 902, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi was presented the 
question of interpretation of the word "divide" as used by 
a mother in a holographic will. The court, after consider-
ing the family background and the context in which the 
word "divide" was used, held: 
"Circumstanced as she was, how did the testatrix 
intend Gladys divide with Richard? The dic-
tionary gives this definition to the word 'divide': 
'1 . To part asunder (a whole); to sever into two 
or more parts or pieces.' To the formal speaker of 
the language, 'divide' would no doubt mean to 
sever into two or more separate parts. But the 
language employed by the testator clearly indi-
cated that she would use words in their colloquial 
meaning. The colloquial meaning of 'divide' is: 
'To deal out something in portions or equal 
shares.' Webster's New International Diction-
ary, Second Edition, Unabridged. Here was a 
mother speaking to her children through her 
will. She was not speaking in the precise lan-
guage of the lawyer or the formal speaker. I t 
is our opinion that Mrs. Boyd intended that 
Gladys and Richard share equally in one-third 
of hear estate. 
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Nor do we think that the fact that Mrs. Boyd 
provided for equal division of the estate into 
three parts for her three children indicated that 
she meant something other than equal division 
when she said that Gladys should divide with 
Richard. The provision for disposition of the in-
surance money if the property burned does not, 
in our opinion, evidence an intention that Rich-
ard should not get half of Gladys' one-third of 
her estate." 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the 
equity principle of constructive trusts. 
In the case of Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P. 
2d 372, the fact situation was as follows: Hawkins, a boy 
of 16, saved $300.00, and on the advice of Perry, his 
uncle, decided to invest his money in a house that could 
be rented instead of purchasing a oar. Hawkins delivered 
his money to Perry on Perry's promise to buy the home 
in Perry's name and then convey it over to Hawkins when 
he became of age. Thereafter Perry made a contract to 
purchase the home. The project would have apparently 
worked as planned, except that Perry added his wife's 
name to the contract as a joint purchaser, and later Pferry 
and his wife moved to Oregon, and were divorced The 
Oregon divorce decree awarded Mrs. Perry all right, title 
and interest of Mr. Perry in the property. 
Upon Hawkins' claim, the trial court held that there 
was a confidential relationship between Hawkins and 
Perry, and under the fact situation, it imposed a construc-
tive trust upon the house held by Mrs. Pterry for the 
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benefit of Hawkins. The trial court found Mrs. Perry 
paid no consideration for the property, was not a bonafide 
purchaser, and therefore she took the property subject 
to Hawkins' rights as a beneficiary. 
In discussing the equity doctrine of a constructive 
trust the court said at Page 375: 
"Equity imposes a conetructive trust to prevent 
one from unjustly profiting through fraud or 
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduci-
ary or confidential relationship. The Utah de-
cision of Chadwick v. Arnold declares '* * * 
that a trust ex maleficio (constructive trust) 
arises Whenever a person acquires a legal title 
to property of another by means of an intentional 
false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the 
same for a certain purpose, and, having thus ob-
tained the tiitta, retains and claims the property 
as his own.' It is now well recognized that ac-
tual fraud is not necessary, but may be presumed 
where there is a relationship of confidence be-
tween the parties to a transaction and there are 
other circumstances tending to show that some 
advantage had been taken by the dominant party 
with a consequent abuse of confidence. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In Haws v. Jensen, we wrote: 
'A constructive trust will be imposed even 
though at the time of the transfer the transferee 
intended to perform 'the agreement, and even 
though he was not guilty of undue influence in 
procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the con-
fidential relation consists merely in the failure 
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of the transferee to perform his promise" (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the Utah case of Haws v. Jensen, 110 Utah 212, 
209 P. 2d 229, at Page 232, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the mother-daughter relationship was evidence of 
the conlidenitial relationship of the parties, citing Scott 
on Trust, Vol. 1, Sec. 44.2, and stating: 
"Constructive trust is imposed even if there is 
no fidudary relationship, such as that between 
attorney and client^ principal and agent, trustee 
and beneficiary, it is sufficient that there is a 
family relationship or other personal relationship 
of such a character that the transferor is justi-
fied in believing that the transferee will act in 
his own interest." 
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 44 comment 
(c) accord. 
"A court of equity in decreeing a constructive 
trust, is bound by no unyielding formula but is 
free to effect justice according to the equities 
peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure 
to perlorm a duty to convey property would re-
sult in unjust enrichment. 3 Bogart on Trusts 
and Trustees, Part 1, 1946, Ed., Sec. 471." 
A case that is remairkiably similar to the case now 
before the court is Jarkieh v. BadagHacco, 75 C. A. 2, 
505, 170 P. 2d 994, California 1946. In this case plaintiff 
and defendant were brother and sister. Anna Jarkieh, 
mother of the parties, was an uneducated person unable 
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to read and write. During her lifetime the mother was in 
a dose relationship with her daughter, and the mother 
trusted the daughter, The evidence was conflicting* but 
the evidence most favorable to plaintiff supports the im-
plied finding by the jury that at the time the trustee and 
two joint tenancy accounts were opened the defendant 
orally promised her mother that upon her mother's death 
she would divide the money equally with her brother. 
The evidence showed that all accounts had their origin 
in accounts formerly in the name of Anna JarMeh. The 
money represented a lifetime of saving and scrimping by 
the mother. 
Defendant attacked the judgment, principally in re-
gard to the joint accounts, and relied on Section 15a of 
the California Bank Act which provided in pertinent part: 
"The making of the deposit in such form (joint 
tenancy) shall, in the absence of fraud or undue 
influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action 
or proceeding to Which either such bank or the 
surviving depositor or depositors may be a party, 
of the intention of such depositors to vest title 
to such deposit and the addition thereto in such 
survivor or survivors." 
In holding that a trust may be created in joint bank 
deposits the court stated at page 99: 
"It might also be pointed out that under See. 
15a, in the case of joint deposits, in the absence 
of fraud or undue influence, the surviving joint 
tenant only takes title to the account. There 
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is nothing in the wosrding of that section that 
precludes a holding that in a proper case, re-
gardless of fraud or undue influence, the surviv-
ing joint tenant holds that legal title in trust for 
another. In such a case the conclusive presump-
tion contained in the section is not being disr 
turbed. Title goes to the survivor but evidence 
is admissible to show that the survivor holds 
such title subject to the terms of a trust." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the case of In re Schulman, 77 N. Y. S. 2, 239 
(1947), the court held: 
"The testimony adduced on the hearing convinc-
ingly establishes that respondent's mother, Ida 
Schulman, was solicitous of the well-being of 
the respondent and intended to provide for him 
by the moneys in the account represented by the 
savings bank book herein involved. The account 
had been opened in her name. In 1939 she caused 
it to be changed by adding the name of her son, 
Joseph, decedent herein, as a true joint account, 
on his promise that the funds therein would be 
used for the benefit of respondent if anything 
should happen to her and decedent herein should 
survive. The provisions of Section 239, Banking 
Law, apply and on Ida Schulman's death, the 
account, by reason of the provisions of that sec-
tion, passed to the joint tenant, decedent herein. 
However, the record contains uncontradicted, 
clear and convincing testimony of admissions by 
decedent, after his mother's death, that he was 
holding the account for respondent's benefit pur-
suant to his mother's direction. A constructive 
trust for the benefit of respondent resulted. 
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The Oourt finds on all evidence that the moneys 
in the account '\tfew held by Joseph Schulman, 
decedent herein, after his mother's death for the 
benefit of respondent and that such moneys are 
the property of respondent. The administratrix 
will, therefore, be directed to assign to respon-
dent the money represented by the account in 
question and execute and deliver to him what-
ever papers or doucments may be necessary to 
perfect his title thereto. 
Proceed accordingly." 
The Idaho case of Vaughan v. First Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, 85 Idaho 266, 378 P. 2d 820 (1963), 
dealt with a question similar to thaJt now before the court. 
In this case Lucy Vaughan and John Vaughan divided 
their common or community funds on April 22, 1960 and 
on May 13, 1960, Lucy commenced an action for divorce 
from John. On May 31^ , 1960, John Vaughan and his 
brother Ted executed a joint savings account agreement 
on an account that represented John's share of the funds 
remaining from the division with his wife. On June 8, 
1960, John Vaughan died, and Lucy Vaughan was ap* 
pointed Administratrix; of his estate. Shortly after his 
brother's death, Ted Vaughan caused the savings account 
to be transferred into his own name. Ted Vaughan is also 
guardian of the person and estate of John's minor daugh-
ter, Mischaei Diane Vaughan. Lucy Vaughan, as Ad-
ministratrix, of John Vaughan's Estate, brought an action 
against Ted Vaughan alleging the money in the savings 
account was an asset of decedent's estate. By his answer 
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Ted Vaughan alleged that John Vaughan had added 
Ted's name to the savings account 
"for the purpose of transferring all right, title 
and interest in the same to defendant (Ted) for 
the use and benefit, and in trust, for John Theo-
dore Vaughan (Decedent's son) and Mischael 
Dianne Vaughan, the son and daughter of the 
decedent." 
At the trial John Theodore Vaughan, decedent's son, 
testified that Lucy Vaughan informed him by letter that 
the savings account 
"was placed in the joint name of your father and 
Ted R. Vaughan for the purpose of creating a 
trust." 
The trial court held that a trust had been created 
under the circumstances and the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision. The court at page 823 stated: 
"In deitmnining the effect of a joint bank ac-
count agreement, the detecraninattve considera-
tion is the intent of the depositor, and this is a 
question for the trier of the facts." 
In the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527,34 Utah 
48, the court recognized the power of the equity court to 
declare and administer a constructive trust. The court 
at page 532 said: 
"Courts of equity in order to administer complete 
justice between the parties, will raise a trust by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
consitroation out of the circumsitance^ and this 
trust they will fasten on the conscience of the 
offending party and wiU convert him into a 
trustee of the legal title and oonder him to hold 
it for the benefit of the owner." 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPOR-
TUNITY BY THE COURT TO HAVE LYNN 
WALKERS TESTIMONY HEARD AND 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT, AND AP-
PELLANT REFUSED TO UTILIZE SUCH 
OPPORTUNITY, 
Appellant made m offer of proof regairding Lynn 
Walker's testimony in chamlbers upon the record. At 
that time the court stated: 
'THE COURT: Wei, without question, counsel, 
the theory that's now presented by the plaintiffs 
in this case makes it an equity case. I have the 
jury here as an advisory jury, and my handling 
of the case at this point is to put to them the 
single question of whether or not following her 
mother's death Mary Walker made the state-
ment: 'Mother told me to keep a little out for 
my arthritis and to divide the rest up.' I am 
going to have the benefit of the jury's advice on 
that question, rememibeaing that the ultimate de-
dsijon in the case is for the judge to make. After 
the jury has deliberated, Mr. Huggins, I am go-
ing to allow you to put that evidence before me. 
If I determine later that the objection, on the 
basis of the deadman statute, is valid, I can order 
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it stricken and not let it be part of my determina-
tion9' (TO 269). 
The evidence referred to above by the Court is the 
evidence in question in Appellant's Point IV* 
After the above remarks by the court, the jury was 
instructed, counsel made their arguments^ and the jury 
retired. Immediately after the jury retired, the following 
statement was made in open Court: 
MR, KUNZ: "Your honor, it was my under-
standing at this time that Mr. Huggins was going 
to make an offer of proof." 
COURT: "He did so in chambers on the record. 
Well, I will take any furtheor offers after a brief 
recess" (TR272). 
Counsel for appellant made no further offer of proof 
subsequent to the offer made in chambers on the date of 
trial despite the above suggestion made by counsel for 
respondents. 
After the finding by the jury on May 9, 1974, the 
court set the case for further hearing on. May 14, 1974, 
and on this date the fellowing inquiry was made by the 
court to counsel for appellant: 
COURT: "My first inquiry was going to be, 
counsel, Whether or not anyone is offering fur-
ther evidence?" 
MR. IRA HUGGINS: "No, we have no further 
evidence in view of the court's ruling in the past" 
(TR273). 
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At this same hearing the court in addressing itself to 
counsel for appellant stated as follows: 
THE COURT: "* * * The first thing I 
want to know is whether or not your side has 
any further evidence to offer." 
MR. IRA HUGGINS: "If the court follows the 
decision of the jury, yes^  we will have to offer 
some evidence" (TR 274). 
The court then made the following inquiry to counsel for 
respondent: 
THE COURT: "Will you be offering further 
evidence, Mr. Kumz?" 
MR. KUNZ: "I have nothing further to offer at 
this time, your Honor. Of course, if counsel offers 
evidence, I would certainly like the right to 
cross-examine. And depending on that evidence, 
I may have to offer some. But at this time I offer 
nothing further" (TR 275). 
The court's repeated offers to appellant to hear Lynn 
Walker's testimony were not accepted, and it is only fair 
to conclude that appellant did not wish to avail herself 
of the opportunity to have the testimony of this witness 
reported in full. 
Rule 43 (c) U. R. C. P. provides as follows in respect 
to excluded evidence: 
"(c) RECORD OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE. 
In an action by a jury, if an objection to a ques^ 
tion propounded to a witness is sustained by the 
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court, the examining attorney may make a spe-
cific offer of what he expects to prove by the an-
swer of the witness. The court may require the 
offer to be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
The court may add such other or further states 
merit as clearly shows the character of the evi-
dence, the form in which it was offered, the ob-
jection made, and the ruling thereon. In actions 
tried without a jury the same procedure may be 
followed, except that the court upon request 
shall take and report the evidence in full, unless 
it clearly appears that the evidence is not admis-
sible on any ground or that the witness is privi-
leged:' 
It is clear from the record that the court definitely 
advised appellant that the ultimate decision in this case 
would be made by the court and not the jury (TR 269). 
The record demonstrates the court gave appellant an 
opportunity to have the testimony of Lynn Walker taken 
in full and on the record for the consideration of the 
court (TR 272, 273, 274). Counsel ftar respondents made 
it dear that he expected such testimony would be offered 
to the court and on the record, and that he was prepared 
to cross examine this witness (TR 272). Appdlant did 
not choose to put sudi testimony on and submit this wit-
ness to cross examination on the evidence as set forth 
in the offer of proof made in chambers (TR 288,273,274). 
It is submitted that by the failure to place such testimony 
in the record and to subject the witness to cross examin-
ation, that appellant has waived any claim that the court 
erred in not considering the tesitimony of Lynn Walker. 
The failure of appellant to present such testimony in the 
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record before the court was not due to the ruling of 
the court, but it was a conscious choice made by appellant. 
Therefore, appellant cannot be said to have suffered any 
prejudice as a result of any ruling by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court imposing a constructive 
trust upon the funds in issue and dividing these funds 
equally among the four children of Lucy Pagano is sup* 
ported by 'clear and cxwivincing evidence' and is a proper 
application of recognized principles of law. It is respect-
fully submitted that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KUNZ, KUNZ & RENOHER 
DAVIDS. KUNZ 
# 7 Bank of Utah Plaza 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondents 
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